Boyd felt that the continual pattern of harassment and shifting positions could continue throughout a conflict, as opposed to attempting to win the entire war at the front in a single battle.
Impressed by the new weapons, De Puy started the process of re-arming the heavy divisions with weapons that would dramatically improve their firepower.
Since forces from the rear could not move forward quickly enough to take place in the titanic battles being envisioned, everyone had to be placed as close to the front lines as possible.
As the war in Vietnam wound down, the US Army started studying their organization and structure, looking for ways to better align it with real-world conflicts. De Puy, to study these issues and produce better doctrine for their forces.
TRADOC concluded that there were two main possibilities for future conflicts, a major armored conflict in Europe, or a primarily infantry fight in other locations around the world.
Air Land Battle replaced 1976's "Active Defense" doctrine, and was itself replaced by the modern "Full Spectrum Operations".
The basic concept of the Blitzkrieg and similar doctrines was for the attacker to secretly concentrate his forces before a limited frontage to gain a local superiority over the defenders, culminating in an attack with at least tactical surprise leading to a breakthrough, which is then rapidly exploited to threaten the rear areas and destabilize the entire defensive position. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), under the direction of General William E.When the Yom Kippur War broke out in 1973, it demonstrated a new lethality of conventional weapons, especially the anti-tank guided missile (ATGM).The new vulnerability of tanks, combined with the improved defensive power of the infantry, led to a revolution of thought within the US Army—that a war in Europe was winnable with conventional weapons.Instead of meeting the Blitzkrieg head-on, Boyd suggested what he called the "counter-blitz", where small groups of equally mobile forces would pick away at the lines of thrust and then move on to the next in a series of hit-and-run attacks.There was no necessity to retain any sort of front line, and the attacks deliberately moved from point to point in order to avoid being bogged down or getting trapped.There was the possibility that the US could win the first battle, only to meet a second unattrited reserve force soon after.